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Abstract
The objective of this paper is to evaluate first- and second-best trading mechanisms for
regulating point and nonpoint source phosphorus emissions. The trading mechanisms are
differentiated on the degree to which regulators can observe abatement efforts.  The deadweight
losses attributable to informational asymmetries and those of the second-best mechanisms will
provide regulators the shadow value of foregoing first-best measures.
*  I wish to thank Jay Coggins, Steve Polasky, Amyaz Moledina, and Jonathan Kaplan for their many insightful and
critical comments on earlier versions of this paper.  The opinions expressed are my own and not necessarily those of
the U.S. Department of Agriculture or the Economic Research Service.2
Mechanism Design for Nutrient Trading under Asymmetric Information
Introduction
Regulators of agricultural, nonpoint sources pollution have traditionally employed policies
designed to encourage agricultural producers to adopt alternative (or “best”) management
practices (BMPs) to mitigate nutrient or sediment emissions (Heimlich and Claassen, 1998).
These are typically cost-share programs (e.g., CRP), which pay farmers directly to adopt
pollution abating management practices.  Modest successes from these agri-environmental
programs (Feather and Hellerstein, 1997; Ribaudo, 1989) illustrate the potential gains to the use
of performance-based, market mechanisms such as effluent fees or tradable emissions permits to
control agricultural pollution. It is not unrealistic to assume that future water quality regulation
will employ various market mechanisms to encourage the adoption of BMPs (USEPA, 2001a).
While some BMPs have been found to be relatively inexpensive to implement (e.g.,
conservation tillage regimes on corn-bean rotations in the Midwest) there are others that are
relatively expensive for a farm to implement (e.g., land retirement). It has been argued that one
means to achieve substantial reductions in total emissions is to allow point sources such as
wastewater treatment facilities or confined animal feeding operations (CAFOs) to purchase
emissions-offsets from surrounding farmers. Motivating this argument is the assumption that it is
cheaper for the utility or feedlot to avoid costly abatement investments by paying farmers to
adopt nutrient best management practices on agricultural cropland.
The transition to permit trading mechanisms for regulating agricultural pollution has not
been quite as rapid as one might have expected given the achievements of trade-based regulatory
systems in other sectors (e.g., S02 permit trading for electric utilities – Coggins and Swinton,3
1996; water trades in California – Howitt, 1998).  The performance or appropriateness of trade-
based mechanisms for nonpoint source (NPS) pollution has been questioned for a number of
reasons (Stavins, 1995; Taff and Senjem, 1996).  One persistent criticism of permit markets that
include nonpoint sources is informational asymmetries lead to a moral hazard problem; i.e.,
farmers may misrepresent abatement efforts (Shortle and Dunn, 1986; Smith and Tomasi, 1999;
Moledina et al., 2001). Many have examined methods of monitoring and enforcement to address
this issue (Russell et al., 1986; Malik, 1993; Garvie and Keeler, 1994; Van Egteren and Weber,
1996; Amacher and Malik, 1996, 1998; Stranlaund and Dhanda, 1999; Harford, 2000; Kaplan et
al., 2001).  These illustrate that, in much the same way second-best policies may be preferable to
first-best policies in the arena of water pricing (Tsur and Dinar, 1997), it may be that due to
informational asymmetries, second-best mechanisms for regulating nonpoint pollution can
achieve abatement more efficiently than can first-best mechanisms.
The objective of this paper then is to evaluate first- and second-best emissions trading
mechanisms in the presence of moral hazard when both point and nonpoint sources are required
to invest in and report abatement efforts. The mechanism design for the emissions trading system
(ETS) is based on the extent to which the regulator can observe various nonpoint abatement
efforts.  A first-best trading mechanism (ETS-2) allows nonpoint sources to trade permits based
on the full range of abatement efforts available to the source.  This is compared to restricted
trading mechanisms: one allowing nonpoint sources to base trades on crop choice, tillage, and
fertilizer application method choices, but not on fertilizer application rates (ETS-1); and another
allowing nonpoint sources to base permit trades only on crop choice and tillage practices (ETS-
0).
1 Furthermore, the regulator can combine a trading mechanism an investment in monitoring
                                                
1 Basing permit trades on the degree to which BMPs are directly observable is similar to recent developments in
USEPA-sponsored offset programs (Environomics, 1999).4
equipment.  Each trading/monitoring mechanism has associated deadweight losses due to
asymmetric information and moral hazard. These losses provide regulators a means to compare
optimal mechanism and monitoring choices when facing a budget constraint.
This paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 defines the model environment and
develops the regulator’s welfare maximization problem.  Section 3 uses regional data from the
Minnesota River Valley to illustrate the effect of asymmetric information on the regulator’s
choice of control and mechanism. Section 4 provides discussion and extensions to the model
framework.  Section 5 concludes with summary comments.
The Model
There are  n sources ( n i   ...,   , 1 = ) that emit phosphorus into a watershed:  m point sources
( j i   ...,   , 1 = ) and n-j nonpoint sources ( n j i   ...,   , 1 + = ).  The regulator has observed historical
emissions by sources for given expected weather patterns and can expect total emissions in the
absence of regulation (ex-ante) to be  ￿ = =
n
i i e E
1 . Total emissions in the presence of regulation
(ex-post) are  ￿ = =
n
i i e E
1 . Aggregate abatement is  ￿ = =
n
i i a A
1 , where abatement effort ( i a ) for
source i is the difference between ex-ante emissions ( i e ) and ex-post emissions ( i e ).
The cost to source i to abate quantity  i a ˆ  is given as  ) ˆ ( i i a C for i = 1, …, j, where  ) ( i i a C
maps the cost-minimizing choice of abatement effort for each source necessary to achieve any
desired abatement level. For nonpoint sources, abatement is a function of two parameters:
observable abatement effort (r) and unobservable abatement efforts (z). These efforts can be
loosely thought of as abatement effort on the observable extensive margin (e.g., crop choice and
tillage practice) and abatement effort on the unobservable intensive margin (e.g., fertilizer5
application methods and rates).
2 The nonpoint abatement cost function can then be written
)) , ( ( i i i i z r a C n j i   ...,   , 1 + = " .
3
These cost functions exhibit the typical properties one might expect from constraining
emissions:  0 ) ( > ¢ i ia a C and 0 ) ( > ¢ ¢ i iaa a C n i   ...,   , 1 = " . Nonpoint abatement is increasing in
abatement effort:  0 > ¢ r a ,  0 > ¢ z a , which implies  0 ) ( > ¢ i ir a C  and  0 ) ( > ¢ i iz a C n j i   ...,   , 1 + = " .
Regulator Problem
As individual costs are convex in abatement it must be that aggregate abatement costs for the
watershed are also convex,  0 ) ( ' > A C  and  0 ) ( > ¢ ¢ A C . The function  ) (A B  maps the benefits to
society of restricting emissions of phosphorus.  Benefits are strictly concave in abatement,
0 ) ( > ¢ A B  and  0 ) ( < ¢ ¢ A B .
4
With perfect information the regulator’s problem, 
0 RP , is to choose aggregate abatement
A ~ to maximize social welfare (SW):
[1] ) ( ) ( max ) ( max
0 A C A B A SW RP
A A - = ” .
The first-order condition characterizing a solution to [1] is necessary and sufficient given the
assumptions on the benefit and cost functions.  This is:
[1a] ) ~ ( ) ~ ( A C A B ¢ = ¢ .
5
                                                
2 Yiridoe and Weersink (1998) discuss abatement costs on the intensive and extensive margins.
3 The regulator has observed (via surveys or direct observation) mean levels of r and z in the past and has mapped
emission levels and profits as a function of weather, soil characteristics, r and z for nonpoint sources using a
biophysical soils model.  Furthermore, given observable data (i.e., weather and soil characteristics) and reported data
(i.e., r and z) the regulator can accurately estimate emissions from nonpoint sources.  As mentioned, the regulator
can readily observe actual r-abatement efforts.  The only parameter that the regulator cannot observe is the farm
choice of z.
4 Assume that  0 ) 0 ( ) 0 ( = ¢ > ¢ C B  and that for A sufficiently large  ) ( ) ( A C A B ¢ < ¢ .
5 The zero abatement corner solution, whereby it is not optimal for the regulator to induce any level of abatement, is
not considered.6
Once chosen from [1a], the regulator can achieve  A ~ by employing a number of regulatory
mechanisms, generally a price (e.g., Pigouvian tax) or quantity (e.g., tradable quota or permit)
approach.
6  Mechanisms have different advantages and disadvantages, but under full information
they can achieve Pareto optimality.  In the case of tradable emissions permits, the regulator may




1 - = ￿ = l . Each permit
represents the right to emit 1 pound of phosphorus into the river in the year the permit was
issued. Under this trading system each source will buy and sell permits ( i x ~ ) and choose
abatement ( i a ~ ) to solve the source problem (SP):
[2] i i i
x a
i x P a C SP
i i
l - ” ) ( min
,
, where  i i i i a e x - - = l  and  l P  is the equilibrium permit price.
The corresponding necessary and sufficient, n+1 first-order conditions are:




1 ￿ = = .
The solution to [1] characterized by the vector of equilibrium abatement levels,  ) ~ , ~ ( ~ z r a a = ,
results in the equalization of marginal abatement costs across sources and is Pareto optimal.
7
Asymmetric Information
Assume now that the regulator has determined  A ~ and  i a ~  ￿ i = 1, …, n, given known costs and
benefits, but cannot directly observe the nonpoint choice vector  z.  There now exists the
incentive for nonpoint sources to misrepresent abatement efforts; i.e., to cheat.  This cheating, if
it occurs, will be of the following form.  First, there is no possibility of point sources
misrepresenting their abatement efforts or of nonpoint sources to misrepresent adoption of  r,
                                                
6 See Weitzman (1974) for an exposition on price and quantity instruments to restrict production of an economic
parameter.7
both of which are freely observed.  If nonpoint sources were fully to exploit the unobservable z
(the vector of all possible unobservable abatement choices), they would simply report
) ˆ , ( ˆ z 0 a a= , where  ) max( ˆ z z = , and adopt  0 0 0 a a = = ¢ ) , ( ˆ .  However, because the regulator
knows  )) , ( ( i i i i z r a C n j i   ...,   , 1 + = "  and because  r is freely observable, the nonpoint sources
must report at the least  ) ~ , ~ ( ~ ) ˆ , ˆ ( ˆ z r a z r a = , resulting in the abatement vector  a 0 r a a ~ ) , ˆ ( ˆ £ = ¢ .
Given this behavioral possibility the regulator can do one or more things depending on
the extent to which  ) , ˆ ( ˆ 0 r a a = ¢  is expected to deviate from  ) ~ , ~ ( ~ z r a a = . The regulator can simply




j i i i a a A
1 1 ˆ ~ ~
, resulting from ETS-2. The
regulator can eliminate abatement credits for  z abatement choices (i.e., not allow nonpoint
sources to base permit trades on expected abatement levels resulting from increasing
unobservable abatement efforts) corresponding to ETS-0 and ETS-1. The regulator may also
invest in monitoring efforts to reveal nonpoint choices of z and employ ETS-0, ETS-1, or ETS-2.
Assume that the regulator can purchase monitoring device (d) at cost CC(d).  One device
(d=1) allows monitoring of nonpoint source application methods.  Another device (d=2) allows
monitoring of application rates.  Both devices can be employed at control cost CC(3).
8 The range
of investment choices available to the regulator is then  ) 3   , 2   , 1   , 0 ( ˛ d , where the following
relationship is assumed: 0<CC(1)<CC(2)<CC(3)<CC(1)+CC(2).  The range of trading
mechanisms is  ) 2 , 1 , 0 ( ˛ m .  Corresponding to the regulator’s choice of mechanism is an
abatement level,
m A m A = ) ( , which solves [1] for ETS-0, 1, and 2, respectively.  For each 
m A  the
regulator will distribute tradable permits, 
m n
i i A E - = ￿ =1l , and invest in monitoring devices (d)
                                                                                                                                                            
7 Trivially from the First Welfare Theorem (Varian, 1992).8
to maximize expected social welfare.  Given d, m, and cheating, the expected abatement levels,
costs and benefits will be 
dm A m d A = ) , ( ,  ) ( )) , ( (
dm dm A C m d A C = , and  ) ( )) , ( (
dm A B m d A B = .
The corollary to [1] is the unconstrained social welfare problem under asymmetric
information [3], where the regulator chooses [d, m] to solve (
1 RP ):
[3]  )) ( ) ( ) ( max ) ( max
, ,





- - = ” .
The first-order conditions for each  ) 2 , 1 , 0 ( ˛ m  characterizing a solution, 



















d A C A B d , 0,1,2 = "m .
At 
dm A ~  the marginal benefits to investing in monitoring devices will equal the marginal costs of
the increased abatement level.
If the regulator is given an exogenous budget ($B) to spend on monitoring, the new
regulator problem is to choose [d, m] to solve (
2 RP ):
[4] ) ( ) ( max ) ( max |
, ,
$




B A C A B A SW RP - = ”  subject to  B d CC $ ) ( £ .























d A C A B d , and
[4b] 0 )
~ ~
( $ ‡ - d CC B n  0 )]
~ ~
( [$
~ ~ = - d CC B l .
Here, ? can be interpreted as the shadow value of increasing the budget to allow the purchase of
increasing investments in monitoring efforts. Optimal investment is characterized by equating
the marginal net benefits of increased abatement due to monitoring efforts with ?.  Given the
discrete nature of monitoring investments and relative effects on the cost function the optimal
                                                                                                                                                            
8 For the moment the control costs are not a function of abatement levels, but are simply fixed costs required each
year to monitor the relevant nonpoint source management practice (e.g., the purchase of LandSat imagery of the
region to determine timing or type of tillage practice).9
choice of 
dm A
~ ~  will always be the maximum allowable under $B.  The optimization required by
the regulator in this sense has no explicit incentive to weigh the marginal welfare gains from
having monitoring devices and their related investment costs.
To better model the regulator’s choice set, suppose now that the regulator must levy a
lump-sum tax ( T) on the ( n-j)  nonpoint sources to pay for the monitoring device(s).  The
regulator facing a balanced budget constraint will choose [d, m] to solve (
3 RP ):





) ( ) ( ) ( max ) ( max
, ,
3 - - - = ”
subject to  T m n d CC ) ( ) ( - £ .























d A C A B d , and
[5b] 0 ) ( ) ( ‡ - - d CC T m n n  0 )] ( ) [( ~ = - - d CC T m n l .
The solution to [5], 
dmT A ~ , will be equivalent to [3].  That is to say, the regulator will invest in
monitoring devices so long as the gains in social welfare achievable under the monitored regime
exceed the cost of purchasing the device.
Sand Creek Application
To illustrate these changes in social welfare across mechanisms and controls this paper utilizes
data gathered from the Sand Creek watershed of the Lower Minnesota Basin. The Lower
Minnesota is the largest source of the 1,000+ tons of phosphorus deposited by the Minnesota
River (Faeth, 1998; Mulla, 1998) into the Mississippi River.  The Sand Creek is one the largest
sub-basins in the Lower Minnesota, draining 148,394 acres of agricultural land and contributing
on average 115,000 lbs./year of phosphorus to the Minnesota River (MPCA, 1994).  These are10
substantial and important quantities given that the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency has
targeted the Minnesota River for 40+% reductions in phosphorus emissions (MPCA, 1999).
Individual sources in the Sand Creek and their average, annual contributions of phosphorus are
listed in Table 1. Estimated costs and benefits for watershed abatement under the three trading
mechanisms are listed in Table 2.
Evaluating the first-order conditions, [5a] and [5b], for all  ) 2 , 1 , 0 ( ˛ m  it is possible to
derive solutions to 
3 RP  given CC(d). Marginal costs, abatement levels, and social welfare are
listed in Table 3.  Given a balanced budget constraint the optimal choice of permit mechanism
and monitoring investment are described in Table 4 for ranges of monitoring costs.  Treating
each acre of agricultural land as a nonpoint source, it can be shown from Table 4 that if the cost
per acre to monitor fertilizer application methods exceeds $2.81/acre, the regulator will choose to
employ the restricted trading program (ETS-1) with no investments in monitoring.
Examining 14 current National Monitoring Programs (USEPA, 2001b), intensity of
monitoring can be broadly separated into two categories: low intensity and high intensity (Table
5).  Choosing values of $1.50/acre/year and $4.00/acre/year respectively for these two categories
would correspond to monitoring costs of $222,000/year and $592,000/year for the Sand Creek.
9
Suppose these two values approximate CC(1) and CC(3). The solution to the balanced budget
social welfare maximization will be  ) ~ (
11T A SW  = $3,231,394 with T = $1.50/acre.  In this case,
under asymmetric information the second-best mechanism ETS-1 outperforms the first-best
mechanism, ETS-2.
10
                                                
9 Recall the 148,394 acres of agricultural land.11
Extension
Hitherto the optimization process is somewhat passive motivated by discrete control costs and
trading mechanisms.  The regulator simply chooses from the six social welfare outcomes
possible under the possible combinations of  ) 3 , 1 , 0 ( ˛ d  and  ) 2 , 1 , 0 ( ˛ m . An extension to the
regulator’s choice set is possible under a permit trading mechanism. Following the distribution of
permit endowments and the establishment of a permit market, assume that the regulator taxes
nonpoint sources and uses this budget to purchase monitoring devices or to buy back permits (X)
to maximize social welfare. This regulator will now choose [ X m d ˆ   , ˆ   , ˆ ] optimally subject to the
balanced budget constraint so that  ) , , ( ˆ X m d A A =  solves 
4 RP :
[6]  T m n A C A B A SW RP
X m d X m d
) ( ) ( ) ( max ) ( max
, , , ,
4 - - - = ”
subject to  T m n d CC X P ) ( ) ( - £ + l .
The Lagrangean for 
4 RP can be written:
[6a] ) ) ( ) (( ) ( ) ( ) ,   , ( X P d CC T m n A C A B X m d L l - - - + - ” l .
The first-order conditions characterizing the solution to [6] are:
[6b] 0 ˆ ) ˆ ( ) ˆ ( ‡ - ¢ - ¢ l A C A B d d  n  0 ] ˆ ) ˆ ( ) ˆ ( [ ˆ = - ¢ - ¢ l A C A B d d d ,
[6c] 0 ˆ ) ˆ ( ) ˆ ( ‡ - ¢ - ¢ l P A C A B X x l  n  0 ] ˆ ) ˆ ( ) ˆ ( [ ˆ = - ¢ - ¢ l P A C A B X X x l , and
[6d] 0 ˆ ) ˆ ( ) ( ‡ - - - X P d CC T m n l n  0 ] ˆ ) ˆ ( ) [( ˆ = - - - X P d CC T m n l l .
It can be seen that at a solution, for positive monitoring investments or permit purchases the net
the marginal benefits of abatement must equal ?, the shadow value on the budget constraint.
                                                                                                                                                            
10 Note that given an exogenous budget greater than $592,000 the regulator will choose the first-best trading system
resulting in  )
~ ~ (
32 A SW = $3,500,049.12
Of particular interest is the comparison between [6] and [5] when CC(1) = $222,000; and
CC(3) = $592,000.  Assume the regulator must choose between taxing nonpoint sources, T =
$1.50/acre or $4.00/acre, respectively, employing ETS-1 or ETS-2,
11 investing in monitoring
devices or buying back permits. Let the social welfare of the permit buy-back be denoted
) ˆ (
bm A SW , where b = H ($B = $592,000) or L ($B = $222,000) (Table 6).  Comparing the social
welfare outcomes under a balanced budget constraint the regulator preferences are given by:
[7]   ) ~ (
11T A SW ￿  ) ˆ (
2 L A SW  ￿  ) ˆ (
1 L A SW ￿  ) ~ (
01T A SW ￿ ) ~ (
32T A SW ￿ ) ˆ (
2 H A SW ￿ ) ˆ (
1 H A SW .
Conclusions
It is clear from the burgeoning literature on both nonpoint pollution and mechanism design that
the effects of asymmetric information on social welfare are both interesting and important topics
to jointly consider. Furthermore the movement towards regulating nonpoint pollution via market
mechanisms must overcome numerous critiques, one being that they are not appropriate for
uncertain nonpoint emissions.  This paper develops a simple regulator’s problem for controlling
point and nonpoint phosphorus emissions.  Regulatory efficiency can be improved by using
market mechanisms to target abatement efforts (e.g., ETS), but social welfare may be
compromised when nonpoint sources are able to misrepresent abatement efforts.
Subject to a balanced budget constraint and known costs and benefits of abatement, the
regulator can address deadweight losses due to moral hazard by investing in monitoring
equipment or by implementing a quasi-cost-share mechanism (a permit buy-back scheme).
Using water quality monitoring budgets under the National Water Quality Monitoring Program it
is possible to determine back-of-the-envelope costs needed to evaluate a permit trading system
                                                
11 ETS-0 is strictly dominated by ETS-1 or ETS-2 (Table 2).13
for regulating phosphorus emissions in a sub-watershed of the Minnesota River.  Using these
monitoring costs and a balanced budget constraint it is shown the restricted trading system (ETS-
1) that taxes agricultural land ( T = $1.50/acre) in order to monitor fertilizer application
mechanisms (CC(1)) results in the highest social welfare ($3,231,394). This result holds even if
the regulator is given the option to tax and buy-back permits.
Employing the restricted permit trading system, ETS-1 and not taxing or investing in
monitoring equipment results in an estimated 10.7% deadweight loss or $2.50 per acre.
Therefore if CC(1) is greater than $370,174 it may be preferable for the regulator to tax and
implement a permit buy-back scheme to circumvent the lump-sum nature of the monitoring costs
modeled here.  For example, if CC(1) > $B = $222,000, the buy-back option results in marginal
social welfare gains (less than 1% over ETS: d = 0, m = 1).
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Table 1
Point and Nonpoint Sources of Phosphorus Loads in the Sand Creek
 Point Sources Emissions Operations Abatement Cost  (C(a)/operation)
Wastewater Treatment Facility – Jordan 2,285 1 0.033166(a)
2
Wastewater Treatment Facility – New Prague 8,445 1 0.004903(a)
2
Feedlots 29,180 92 0.839657(a)
2
TOTALS 40,114 lbs/year
 Nonpoint Sources Emissions Acres Abatement Cost  (C(a)/acre)
 Soil Map Unit - MN079A (>300’)
a 20,161 59,014 136.56 (a)
2
Soil Map Unit - MN080A (>300’) 4,777 11,673 230.90 (a)
2
Soil Map Unit - MN081A (>300’) 3,452 8,476 87.73 (a)
2
Soil Map Unit - MN163A (>300’) 2,180 8,300 350.76 (a)
2
Soil Map Unit - MN165A (>300’) 3,070 2,525 14.85 (a)
2
Soil Map Unit - MN169A (>300’)
b 1,685 1,433 -2.69 (a)
2
Soil Map Unit - MN171A (>300’) 243 508 155.69 (a)
2
Soil Map Unit - MN178A (>300’) 155 549 593.47 (a)
2
Soil Map Unit - MN196A (>300’) 16,648 34,953 131.74 (a)
2
Soil Map Unit - MN079B (<300’) 8,188 9,219 20.20 (a)
2
Soil Map Unit - MN080B (<300’) 1,922 1,806 34.16 (a)
2
Soil Map Unit - MN081B (<300’) 1,453 1,373 12.98 (a)
2
Soil Map Unit - MN163B (<300’) 1,317 1,928 51.89 (a)
2
Soil Map Unit - MN165B (<300’) 1,579 499 2.20 (a)
2
Soil Map Unit - MN169B (<300’)
b 1,118 366 -0.40 (a)
2
Soil Map Unit - MN171B (<300’) 41 33 23.03 (a)
2
Soil Map Unit - MN178B (<300’) 54 73 87.97 (a)
2
Soil Map Unit - MN196B (<300’) 7,016 5,665 19.49 (a)
2
TOTALS 75,058 lbs/year 148,394 acres
Source:  Johansson (2000).  
a The values in parentheses refer to the distance separating the source of a water transport channel (Sharpley et al., 1999). 
b The nonpoint
source abatement cost functions are estimated over the intensive management margin.  In certain instances over this range the estimation indicates that the
constrained profit exceeds the unconstrained profit (i.e., negative abatement costs).  This phenomenon is reflected in actuality (adoption of conservation tillage
regimes), but does revert to the expected convex form when extensive management practices are included (Johansson, 2000).17
Table 2
Aggregate Costs and Benefits of Abatement for  ) 2 , 1 , 0 ( ˛ m
Mechanism Aggregate Costs Aggregate Benefits
ETS-2 ) ( 000441 . 0 ) (
2 2 = = =
m m A A C ) ln * ( 2024 . 50 2024 . 635 ) (
2 2 2 2 = = = = - =
m m m m A A A A B
ETS-1 ) ( 000461 . 0 ) (
1 1 = = =
m m A A C ) ln * ( 2024 . 50 2024 . 635 ) (
1 1 1 1 = = = = - =
m m m m A A A A B
ETS-0 ) ( 001242 . 0 ) (
0 0 = = =
m m A A C ) ln * ( 2024 . 50 2024 . 635 ) (
0 0 0 0 = = = = - =
m m m m A A A A B
 Source(s):  Mathews et al. (2000), Johansson (2000).
Table 3
Marginal Costs, Abatement levels, and Social Welfare for 
3 RP
Mechanism Monitoring Device Abatement
 a Social Welfare
3 48,800 $3,500,049 -CC(3)
1 41,690 $3,154,926 -CC(1) ETS-2
0 30,801 $3,079,450
1 47,804 $3,453,394 -CC(1)
ETS-1
0 31,094 $3,083,220
ETS-0 0 28,323 $2,418,186
             b Abatement levels correspond to the expected level of aggregate abatement given the regulator’s choice of
       [d, m] and source choice of actual abatement given the presence of moral hazard.
Table 4
Optimal Mechanism/Monitoring Choices
CC(d) Mechanism Device Social Welfare
$416,829 = CC(1) + $46,655 > CC(3) ETS-2 3 ) ~ (
32T A SW  = $3,500,049 - CC(3)
$370,174 = CC(3) - $46,655 > CC(1) ETS-1 1 ) ~ (
11T A SW  = $3,453,394 - CC(1)
CC(1) = $370,174 ETS-1 0 ) ~ (
01T A SW  = $3,083,22018
Table 5
Monitoring Costs for Different Watershed Size and Intensity
Location Monitoring  Cost Acres Monitoring Intensity ($/ac/yr)
Elm Creek, NE $18,125 35,800 0.5063
Lake Pittsfield, IL $88,540 7,000 12.6486
Sny Magill Watershed, IA $111,116 22,780 4.8778
Otter Creek, WI $25,000 7,040 3.5511
Lake Champlain Basin, VT $109,718 7,576 14.4823
Waukegan River, IL $1,441 7,640 0.1886
Morro Bay Watershed, CA $62,000 48,450 1.2797
Lightwood Knot Creek, AL $181,429 47,300 3.8357
Long Creek, NC $71,648 28,480 2.5157
Totten and Eld Inlet, WA $94,167 67,200 1.4013
Sycamore Creek, MI $84,500 67,740 1.2474
Bad River, SD $16,728 2,053,760 0.0082
Swatara Creek, PA $35,000 27,520 1.2718
Walnut Creek, IA $110,100 24,570 4.4811
Source:  USEPA (2001b).
Table 6
Optimal Abatement, Government Buy-Back, and Social Welfare for 
4 RP
Budget ETS Abatement Buy-Back Tax/acre Social Welfare
1 39,484 lbs 3,742 $1.50 ) ˆ (
1 L A SW  = $3,092,258 $222,000
2 32,633 lbs 3,879 $1.50 ) ˆ (
2 L A SW = $3,092,579
1 39,685 lbs 8,605 $4.00 ) ˆ (
1 H A SW  = $2,707,709 $592,000
2 38,828 lbs 9,094 $4.00 ) ˆ (
2 H A SW  =$2,734,604